DELEGATING DEMOCRACY – THE SIPHONING OF IMMIGRATION POWER FROM
CONGRESS TO THE STATES AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES, AND THE NEED FOR A
NEW APPROACH.
OLEG S. KOBELEV
The question of who is and is not an American has occupied Americans and nonAmericans alike since the inception of the United States.1 Unlike many other nations we
don’t define belonging based on particular criteria such as race, ethnicity, religion or
bloodline.2 Instead the idea of who belongs and who doesn’t is defined by a vague,
shifting and uncertain patchwork of laws, customs, history and assumptions that
Americans, their government and immigrants make about what it takes to be an
American. This ambivalence about national identity is not confined to abstract questions
of belonging. Ordinary Americans as well as their elected representatives in Congress
face the question of who is and is not an American every time they confront uneasy and
conflicting choices regarding immigration.
Congressional ambivalence on these difficult issues often results in decisions that
tend to delegate the bulk of the decision-making to administrative agencies and state
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In fact the Revolutionary War itself was probably the first of many battles to define who Americans really
are as a nation, as a people, and as an idea. The adoption of Constitution, the Westward expansion, the
Civil War, he Mararthy era, and the Civil Rights movement are but a few of seminal events in American
history that continued to shape our perception of who is and is not American.
2
For example, Germany, Switzerland and Japan define citizenship primarily in terms of lineage or
bloodline (jus sanguinis) as opposed to citizenship by birth (jus soli) in the United States. See German
Embassy in Ottawa, at http://www.ottawa.diplo.de/en/04/citizenship_20law/UB_20citizenshiplaw.html
(describing recent changes in German law allowing acquisition of citizenship by birth (jus soli) in addition
to citizenship through bloodline); See also Gildas Simon, Who Goes Where at
http://www.unesco.org/courier/1998_11/uk/dossier/txt21.htm (describing different models of citizenship
based on blood and birth, using examples of Switzerland, Japan and others as countries defining citizenship
in terms of bloodline).
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governments,3 with Congress choosing to make vague pronouncements in hopes that they
will satisfy constituents and the lobbyists alike.4 I call this approach “have your cake and
eat it too,” because it allows Congress, faced with conflicting pressures coming from
businesses, immigrant lobbies, and other stakeholders, to escape the responsibility for
failures and take credit for successes of immigration policies. Congress manages to have
its cake and eat it too at the same time as it shifts the brunt of the decision-making to state
and federal agencies run by unelected bureaucrats. This ability of Congress to delegate
broad legislative power to other branches of government lies at the heart of the ironically
named non-delegation doctrine.
Some courts and scholars think that this is a perfectly healthy way for a
democracy to function, arguing that agencies’ particularized expertise in the field, the
scale and sheer volume of regulation necessary, and the opportunity for deliberation
inherently unavailable to a legislative body all require broad, general directives from
Congress.5 Others, including this author, view the problem as a more fundamental failure
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See generally Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public
Authority (New York: Norton 1969) (discussing the dangers of vagueness and generality of statutes that
delegate power to agencies) (thereafter Lowi, The End of Liberalism).
4
Id.
5
See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S.748, 758 (1996) ("To burden Congress with all federal rulemaking
would divert that branch from more pressing issues, and defeat the Framers' design of a workable National
Government."); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) ("[I]n our increasingly complex
society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent
an ability to delegate power under broad general directives."). See also Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC,
329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946) ("The judicial approval accorded these 'broad' standards for administrative action
is a reflection of the necessities of modern legislation dealing with complex economic and social
problems."); See generally Bruce A. Ackerman & William T. Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air, 54-58 (Yale
University Press: 1981) (using case study of Clean Air Act to suggest that broad delegations to agencies
may produce policy results superior to detailed legislated solutions, in part because of interest group
influence on Congress).
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of democracy, a symptom of government in crisis and the solution as a prescription to
restore the system back to what it was originally intended to be.6
Whatever merits these competing theories present, the importance of the form and
substance that Congressional delegation takes in relation to immigration cannot be
overestimated, given the plenary power of Congress over the matter.7 People’s lives are
literally at stake. Access to basic necessities of life is at stake. Child custody, health care,
transportation and jobs are at stake. Truly, few other areas of Congressional delegation
deal more directly with the most basic aspects of people’s livelihood than administrative
agencies’ regulation of non-citizens.8 I shall argue that a different doctrine of delegation
in the context of immigration and alienage law is necessary, if we are to fulfill our
commitment to the democratic ideal of holding our government accountable to the wishes
of the governed.
To accomplish this goal, this paper will seek to both ask and answer two
questions: (1) is plenary power Congress enjoys over immigration delegable and to
whom, and if so (2) how? The answers to these two questions underline the essence of
the new delegation doctrine I propose. I will call it explicit delegation. I answer the first
question in the affirmative, noting that nothing in either history or text of the Constitution
precludes Congress from delegating its power to federal administrative agencies and the
6

See e.g., Lowi, The End of Liberalism, supra note 3; Devid Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility:
How Congress Abuses the People Through Delegation (1993) (proposing strict non-delegation doctrine as a
way to police abuses in government); See also Thomas W. Merril, Rethinking Article I, Section I: From
Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 2097 (2004) (arguing for a new exclusive
system of delegation to correct past problems) (hereinafter Merril: Exclusive Delegation).
7
See e.g., Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 580 (1889) (stating that any attempt to restrict Congressional
power to exclude aliens would be a diminution of the sovereignty of the United States); see also Oceanic
Steam Navigationn Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909) (“over no conceivable subject is the
legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over [the admission of aliens].”).
8
For example U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (Department of Homeland Security division)
administers programs as diverse as adoptions, naturalization and citizenship, refugees and asylum petitions,
issuance of employment visas and others. Immigration and Services Benefits at
http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/index.htm.
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states in the same manner. The second and an equally difficult question concerns the
extent and the nature of Congressional delegation. Here I shall argue that Congress needs
to adopt explicit delegation doctrine as a principle vehicle for delegating legislative
power to both federal agencies and state governments.
Part I of this paper begins with the general contours of the existing delegation
doctrine and then focuses on the delegation of plenary power of Congress over
immigration and alienage law in both intra-federal and federal-to-state regimes. I used
restrictions on employment of aliens to illustrate the general principles of delegation. Part
II begins with the discussion of weaknesses of the non-delegation doctrine and proposes
explicit delegation as a new and more desirable alternative. In this context I discuss the
implications and the practicality of extending the reach of explicit delegation to both
intra-federal and federal-to-state levels, arguing that exclusivity of immigration power in
federal government requires explicit delegation, but does not bar delegation altogether.
Finally, Part III discusses of the role of the judicial review of agency and state actions
pursuant to Congressional delegation under the new regime of explicit delegation. I
conclude with a discussion of reasons why delegating power to both State and federal
administrative agencies would not just be a more doctrinally consistent approach, but
would also increase transparency and efficiency of our government, given the new
regimes of judicial review I proposed.
Part I: Non-Delegation - a Story of the Most Mislabeled Doctrine in American
Jurisprudence
Section A - Nature and history of federal delegation – a legacy of doctrinal confusion

4

The Constitution assigns all legislative powers of the federal government to
Congress. Section 1, Article I of the U.S. Constitution states this much: “All legislative
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.”9 For over two centuries the Supreme
Court viewed this clause, however, to mean that Congress could vest the executive
branch of government with its legislative authority, as long as there was some intelligible
principle guiding this delegation.10 The rationales for such delegation differed. In its early
days the Court preferred the detail-filling rationale, according to which the Court found
that Congress could delegate to administrative agency the power to “fill-up” the details in
the legislative scheme.11 The justification for this “fill-up” rationale that became popular
in the midst of the progressive era of the 20th century was that objectivity and expertise of
administrative agencies made delegation desirable.12 As such, in Humphrey’s Executor v.
United States13 the Court stated that the long terms of commissioners on Interstate
Commerce Commission were not just permitted but desirable because it allowed the
Commissioners to acquire the necessary expertise.14 The Court likewise noted that
Federal Trade Commission allowed the creation of a pool of experts “appointed by law
and informed by expertise.”15
The Court envisioned only one conceivable limit on the authority of Congress to
delegate its lawmaking power to administrative agencies – namely that such delegation
9

U.S. Const. Art I, §1
Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: a Delegation Doctrine for the
Administrative State, 109 Yale L.J. 1399, 1403 (2000) (thereafter Schultz: Schechter Poultry).
11
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 43 (1825) (granting federal courts an authority to adopt their own rules
of process); Buttfiled v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904) (upholding delegation to “establish uniform
standards” for importing tea).
12
Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 624 (1935).
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
10
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follow “an intelligible principle.”16 Incidentally, the definition of intelligible principle
was so vague that only two decisions in the entire history of non-delegation doctrine have
ever been stuck down as violating it, and both arose from the same statute – National
Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA).17 In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,18 the Court stuck
down section 9(c) of the statute, which authorized the president to restrict interstate
transportation of oil produced in violation of state law.19 In Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States,20 the Court invalidated section 3 of the statute, authorizing President to
approve “codes of fair competition” proposed by private industry groups.21 The Court
based its decision in the two cases on the fact that neither section gave the executive any
guidance on how to exercise discretion.22 Furthermore, section 3 of the statute
specifically allowed the President to pass the authority to a private industry group to
make the standards and then simply approve them without any additional review.23 The
Court viewed that as tantamount to delegating legislative authority to a private group or
an individual.24
After this brief flirtation with non-delegation, the Court never again invalidated a
Congressional delegation of power even where the standards for such delegation were
very vague. As such, the proverbial “line in the sand” between the statutes that the Court
was willing to strike down and the ones it was willing to enforce was the difference

16

Hampton Jr. & Co v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
Schultz: Schechter Poultry, supra n. 10 at 140.
18
293 U.S. 388 (1935).
19
Id. at 430.
20
295 U.S. 495 (1935).
21
Id. at 538-39.
22
Id. at 551 (“The delegated power of legislation which has found expression in this code is not canalized
within banks that keep it from overflowing. It is unconfined and vagrant . . . .") (Cordozo, J., concurring).
23
Id. at 541-42.
24
Id. (finding that such delegation to be “utterly inconsistent with constitutional prerogatives…of
Congress.”).
17
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between having vague standards and having no standards at all.25 The willingness of the
Court to uphold the very broad and vague delegation of legislative power essentially
created two parallel sources of legislation – one administrative and one Congressional.26
To escape the problems posed by the text of the Constitution, which seemed to expressly
prohibit this exact situation,27 the Supreme Court deemed the exercise of legislative
power by the administrative agencies to be quasi-legislative, while labeling the power of
Congress legislative.28 Of course the distinction is meaningless, especially in view of
decision in INS v. Chadha, which invalidated the one Congressional attempt to establish a
real difference between the two systems in the form of a legislative veto.29 As such under
the current non-delegation doctrine the legislative power exercised by the administrative
agency is functionally the same as the legislative power of Congress.
The modern rationale for the existence of delegation is primarily practical. The
current regime is essential, in the words of Justice Scalia,30 because of “the functional
centrality of delegation in our modern system of government.”31 Simply stated, without
delegation doctrine federal government simply would not be able to function. This

25

In Loving v. United States, the court upheld a delegation to the President to define what ‘aggravating
factors” would permit the death penalty in court martial without any further guidance. 517 U.S. 748, 76869 (1996). Similarly in Mistretta v. United States, the Court upheld a delegation to the Sentencing
Commission to “promulgate sentencing guidelines for every federal criminal offense” without any other
guidance. 488 U.S. 361, 371-72 (1989).
26
See Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workman v. Connaly, 337 F.Supp. 737, 745 (1971) (“There
is no analytical difference, no difference in kind, between the legislative function—of prescribing rules for
the future—that is exercised by the legislature or by the agency implementing the authority conferred by
the legislative).
27
US Const. Art I, §1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.”)
28
Humphrey’s Executor v. US, 295 U.S. 602, 624 (1935); See also I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954
n.16 (1983) (noting Court’s use of term “quasi-legislative”).
29
I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
30
A former administrative-law professor himself
31
Mistretta v. United States 488 U.S. 361, 415-16 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (1989).
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explanation, however, does little to explain the remarkable vagueness of standards
governing delegation.
It was the constitutional and administrative law scholars of all stripes who
attempted to provide an explanation. Some like Schoenbrod32 see delegation as a sign of
sick democracy and Congress as abdicating its Constitutional responsibilities.33 They
accuse Congress of intentionally using non-delegation to claim credit for benefits and
escape the blame for shortcomings and failings.34 Schoenbrod likewise claims that
Congress deliberately delegates in a ploy to shift the blame for the burdens that
legislation imposes, intentionally structures its delegation authority in a way that any
administrative action will benefit special interests, and makes delegation so incoherent as
to prevent the agency from adopting rules that would burden the industry.35 Yet others,
particularly Mashaw and Schuck argue that delegation does not threaten democracy.
Mashaw argues that presidential oversight of agency action ensures democratic
accountability, and in fact makes agencies more responsive to democratic pressures.36
This is so, according to Mashaw, because, as one person, the President is inherently more
visible than 435 separate members of Congress, and thus is more accountable for the
failing of his administrative state.37 Shuck claims that agency rulemaking is more
responsive to the public interest than Congressional legislation because agencies are more
accessible to interest groups and ordinary citizens than members of Congress since the

32

David Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility: How Congress Abuses the People Through
Delegation (1993) (hereinafter Schoenbrod: Power Without Responsibility).
33
Id. at 187.
34
Id. at 16.
35
Id.
36
Jerry L. Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, & Governance 132 (1997).
37
Id.
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costs of participation are much lower.38 Further, agency heads are not dependent on
campaign donations for their continued employment, which, in turn, reinforces their
relative imperviousness to industry pressure.39
Scholarly debate notwithstanding, it is clear that non-delegation doctrine in
general faces significant problems. These problems are even more acute in the context of
immigration and alienage law, where plenary power doctrine allows delegation of
unprecedented amount of power to administrative agencies. I will now turn to the
discussion of plenary power of Congress over immigration and alienage law and its
unique relationship with the delegation doctrine.
Section B: Sources and dimensions of plenary power
The Supreme Court once remarked that “over no conceivable subject is the
legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over [the admission of aliens].”40
This pronouncement best captures the scope and the breath of power that Congress
exercises over immigration and alienage regulation. Remarkably, the doctrine of plenary
power showed little signs of fading since its introduction at the end of 19th century, and
remains as potent today as it its inception in 1889.41 Interestingly, while the breath of
plenary power doctrine has rarely been questioned42 the exact Constitutional source of its
legitimacy remains unclear. The sources often cited include the actual text of the

38

Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 775,
783-90 (1999).
39
Id.
40
Oceanic Steam Navigationn Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909).
41
Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law after a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms
and Statutory Interpretation, 100 Yale L.J. 545, 554 (1990) (hereinafter Motomura: Phantom Norms).
42
See e.g., Justice Jackson’s dissent in Shaughhnessy v. United States ex. Rel. Mezei, 354 U.S. 206, 224
(1953) (arguing for more substantial due process than what was granted under the banner of plenary power
doctrine).
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Constitution,43 foreign commerce power,44 and the dubiously named inherent sovereignty
principle,45 also sometimes referred to as extra-constitutionality principle.46
Despite uncertain origins, however, Constitutional dimensions of plenary power
have been well established. As such, while the Chinese Exclusion Case47 stands for
proposition that federal government is unconstrained in its discretion regarding categories
for the admission of aliens,48 in Nashumura Ekiu v. United States,49 the Court extended
the purview of plenary power to cover procedures for enforcing admission criteria
entrusted to agency officials.50 In Fong Yue Ting v. United States,51 the Court applied
plenary power doctrine in the context of deportation of aliens, holding that deportation
did not constitute punishment for the purposes of due process of the 5th amendment, and
thus was immune from judicial review.52 Ominously stating that “whatever procedure
authorized by Congress is, it due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned,” the
Court further “clarified” the due process requirements for aliens detained at the border in
43

U.S. Const. Art I §8 cl. 4 (“Congress shall have power…[t]o establish an [sic] uniform rule of
Naturalization.”)
44
In perhaps the earliest formulation of what was to become plenary power doctrine the Court in 1884
Head Money Case upheld a federal statute imposing tax on owners of vessels that transported foreign
passengers into the US, holding that transportation of foreign passengers was “part of commerce with
foreign nations.” 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
45
Responding to the challenge to Congressional law banning immigration of Chinese laborers, including
those who have previously been admitted into the U.S, the Supreme Court in Chinese Exclusion Case
stated that any attempt to restrict congressional power to exclude aliens would be a diminution of the
sovereignty of the United States. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
46
The principle was articulated in a case of Curtis-Wright, where the Supreme Court stated that the idea of
federal government as a government of limited power was only accurate in the context of internal affairs
because those powers were taken from the realm of powers that originally belonged to the individual states
or colonies. However, because foreign affairs powers, including immigration were never the states’ to
begin with (having passed directly from the English Crown to the colonies as a whole) and thus were
“extra-constitutional.” 29 U.S. 304 (1936).
47
130 U.S. 581 (1889).
48
Id. at 604 (“United States, in their relation with foreign countries and their subjects…[is] invested with
powers…the exercise of which can be invoked for the maintenance of its absolute independence and
security.”)
49
142 U.S. 651 (1892).
50
Id. at 660.
51
149 U.S. 698 (1893).
52
Id. at 715.
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Knauff v. Shaughnessy53 and substantive categories for deportation in Harisiades v.
Shaghnessy.54
Overall, Congressional power over immigration law, especially in the context of
delineating admission categories for aliens has been virtually unconstrained in its
discretion. I shall now turn to the discussion of the consequences and application of the
plenary power to delegation in intra-federal and federal-to-state contexts, using
employment of non-citizens (an alienage law issue) as, hopefully, a representative
example of the general delegation regime.
Section C – Delegation of immigration and alienage power to administrative
agencies in intra-federal context
The power of Congress to delegate its legislative authority to administrative
agencies in the context of alienage law has seen very few limits. This, of course, is
unsurprising, given the Court’s view of the plenary power doctrine as a guiding principle
of immigration and alienage law.55 The restrictions on hiring of non-citizens in federal
government, both far-reaching and comprehensive, may serve as a good illustration of
this general principle. The restrictions begin with Congress56 and the President,57 and end
up affecting virtually every level of federal government.58 The reason for this is because

53

338 U.S. 537 (1950).
342 U.S. 580 (1952). The court did grant limited due process safeguards in Yamataya v. Fisher, however
for those aliens who are located inside the United States. 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
55
See Section B, infra
56
In fact every appropriation bill since 1939 had Congressional ban on employing certain non-citizens in
federal positions within continental United States, with each agency having responsibility apply the law,
Office of Personnel Management, Memorandum on Federal Employment of Non-Citizens, at
http://www.opm.gov/employ/html/Citizen.htm
57
Executive Order 11935 (September 2, 1976) restricts the employment of non-citizens into "competitive
service" positions covered by Title 5 of the U.S. Code. This applies to all agencies with competitive
service positions, any place in the world.
58
Office of Personnel Management, Memorandum on Federal Employment of Non-Citizens, at
http://www.opm.gov/employ/html/Citizen.htm (noting that implementing policies prescribed by
Congressional ban on hiring of non-citizens is responsibility of each individual agency).
54
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Congress gave the President authority to regulate executive branch employees, and
delegated broad rule-making power to the Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”).59
Pursuant to that authority OPM, in conjunction with the executive order 11935, barred
admission into federal civil service of non-citizens as a way to “best promote the
efficiency of the service.”60
In Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,61 the Supreme Court upheld the principle of such
delegation, holding that presidential authorization would be sufficient to justify certain
hiring restrictions.62 Individual agency regulations precluding employment of noncitizens who were not permanent residents were likewise upheld for constitutionality,
although remanded to see if they were within statutory authorization.63 The only obvious
limitation on the agency’s discretion to discriminate appears to be the Court’s insistence
that there is a legitimate basis to presume that discriminatory rule thus promulgated was
intended by Congress to serve that interest.64 Importantly, however, the Court in
Hampton stuck down a Civil Service Commission regulation barring aliens in federal
employment,65 demonstrating that the usual deference the Court accorded to agency’s
discretion would be stripped if exercised improperly. The Court noted that because the
Commission had “no responsibility for foreign affairs…establishing immigration quotas
or conditions of entry, or naturalization process” it operated outside the purview of

59

5 U.S.C. § 5115. Congress, however, retains significant authority over the terms and conditions of federal
employment. See 5 U.S.C. pt. III.
60
5 U.S.C.A. §3301(f)
61
426 U.S. 88 (1976).
62
Id. at 104-105 (“[petitioners] correctly state that the need for undivided loyalty in certain sensitive
positions clearly justifies a citizenship requirement in at least some parts of the federal service, and that the
broad exclusion serves the valid administrative purpose of avoiding the trouble and expense of classifying
those positions which properly belong in executive or sensitive categories.”).
63
Toval v. U.S. Postal Service, 3 F.3d. 1271 (1993).
64
Id. at 1278.
65
426 U.S. 188, 116-17 (1976)
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authority given to it by Congress,66 underscoring the point that the potency of the
authority delegated pursuant to the plenary power doctrine had to be tempered by a sound
decision-making process.
The Hampton decision was not an isolated case. The Court had consistently
shown its willingness to scrutinize agency interpretation arising out of Congressional
delegation where rights of aliens were concerned. In a whole series of cases preceding
Hampton, the Court in Bridges v. Waxon,67 Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan,68 Wong Yang Sung
v. McGrath,69 Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding,70 and Woodby v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service71 read statutes authorizing administrative restrictions on aliens
narrowly, repeatedly construing the statutes in favor of aliens.72 In his article detailing
these cases73 Professor Hiroshi Motomura argues that a possible explanation for the
Court’s behavior was the influence of “phantom constitutional norms” – real
constitutional norms coming from a mainstream public law that the Court could not
directly apply in interpreting immigration statutes because of the plenary power

66

Id. at 114.
326 U.S. 135 (1945) (overturning the deportation of a union activist Harry Bridges under the statute
authorizing deportation on grounds such as membership and affiliation with organizations that teach the
overthrow of the United States Government by force; noting the harsh consequences of deportation, despite
the Courts own refusal to equate deportation with criminal punishment).
68
333 U.S. 6, 7 (1948) (holding that, given harsh consequences of deportation, statutes and regulations that
are ambiguous on exact grounds for deportation must be read in light most favorable to the aliens).
69
339 U.S. 33 (1950) (holding that a combination of adjudicative and prosecutorial roles by immigration
inspectors in some deportation cases conflicted with the Administrative Procedure Act’s (“APA”)
separation-of-functions provisions, despite the fact that by its terms APA only applied to “adjudication
required by the statute,” and there was little indication, outside the court’s own insistence, that a
deportation hearing was so required.)
70
344 U.S. 590 (1953) (overturning the government’s denial of entry to Chew, a returning permanent
resident, without a hearing and as prejudicial to public interest, holding the authorizing statute ‘s provisions
allowing denial of admission without a hearing not applicable to Chew).
71
385 U.S. 276 (1966) (requiring that standard of proof the government must meet in deportation proceeds
was “clear…convincing evidence” rather than “preponderance of evidence, as the government had
suggested claiming that such a reading was consistent with what the Congress intended when passing the
statute.)
72
Motomura: Phantom Norms, supra n. 41, at 573.
73
Motomura: Phantom Norms, supra n. 41, at 567-73.
67
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doctrine.74 I believe that an alternative or, perhaps, concurrent explanation stems from the
Court’s general concern over vague and overbroad Congressional delegation of the
legislative power to administrative agencies in the context of plenary power doctrine – a
kind of “phantom non-delegation doctrine with teeth,” where the Court, unwilling or
unable to deal with the failings of non-delegation doctrine directly, instead turned to
scrutinizing agency interpretation as a way to alleviate its concerns.
Section D – Delegation of immigration and alienage powers to the states
In a general context of federalism, the principles of concurrent powers presuppose
that States can act within their police powers unless preempted by Congress pursuant to a
valid constitutional delegation such as immigration power.75 As such, Congress can
empower the states to act by either direct delegation or by withholding the exercise of its
power.76 The primary vehicle for Congress to delegate its powers to the states consists of
allowing or authorizing state action in aid or supplementary to federal legislation.77
Examples include the Congressional delegation of authority to define elements of federal
crime,78 conforming federal land requirements to local and state laws,79 and making it a
federal crime to violate a state wildlife statute.80 One circuit court went as far as to say

74

Motomura: Phantom Norms, supra n. 41 at 573.
See e.g., Joshua D. Sarnoff, Cooperative Federalism, the Delegation of Federal Power and the
Constitution, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 205, 226 (1997).
76
Id.
77
Kramer v. United States 245 U.S. 478 (1918).
78
United States v. McKenzie, 99 F.3d 813 (7th Cir. 1996) ( allowing states to define elements of federal
crime, in penalizing possession of a firearm by a person convicted of federal crime, in penalizing the
possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year).
79
Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U.S. 119, 126 (1905) ("It is not of a legislative character in the
highest sense of the term, and as an owner may delegate to his principle agent the right to employ
subordinates, giving to them a limited discretion, so it would seem that Congress might rightfully entrust to
the local legislature the determination of minor matters respecting the disposal of these lands.”).
80
United States v. Guthrie 50 F.3d 936 (11th Cir. 1995) (allowing a federal statute that makes it unlawful to
deal in any fish or wildlife taken in violation of any state law or regulation, holding that such a statute does
not represent a true delegation of Congressional power).
75
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that non-delegation issues are not implicated at all where Congress delegates power to the
states, insofar as such delegation is consistent with the principles of federalism.81
In this permissive environment, the early history of state regulation of alienage
law may serve as a useful example. Historically, in the absence of federal legislation,
state regulation of employment of non-citizens has been marked by blatant racism,
discrimination and prejudice. In Heim v. McCall82 the Supreme Court upheld the lower
court’s decision that labor law prohibiting employment of aliens on public works
contracts was valid because the state was deemed to have the same right to discriminate
in hiring as a private individual.83 The tide has turned in the second part of the 20th
century, as courts began to increasingly scrutinize states’ discrimination of aliens,
holding that such discrimination must be justified by a compelling state interest and be
narrowly tailed to its avowed goal.84
The courts had followed two primary rationales in overturning these state statutes:
(1) violations of equal protection of the 14th amendment,85 and (2) conflicts with the
federal scheme occupying the field or preemption.86 The two seminal cases breaking new
81

Kentucky Div., Horsemen's Benev. & Protective Ass'n, Inc. v. Turfway Park Racing Ass'n, Inc., 20 F.3d
1406 (6th Cir. 1994).
82
88 Misc. 291 (1915), affirmed 239 U.S. 175 (1915).
83
Id. at 194. See also Rok v. Legg 27 F. Supp. 243 (1939), Aron v. Leavy 219 Cal. 456 (1933), Lee v.
Lynn 223 Mass 109 (1916), People v. Crane, 214 NY 154 (1915).
84
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
85
Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State 71 Cal. 2d 566 (1969) (holding to be denial of the equal protection of the
law statutory provisions prohibiting the employment of aliens in public works); See e.g., Moham v. Parks,
352 F. Supp. 518(1973) (invaliding the ordinance restricting municipal employment to citizens of United
States); Miranda v. Nelson, 351 F. Supp. 735 (1972) (invalidating Arizona statute preventing non-citizens
from being employed upon or in connection with any state, county or municipal work or employment);
Orlando v. Florida, 751 F. Supp. 974 (1990) (holding Florida statutes requiting public employees to take a
loyalty oath that recites that employee is a citizen of the state and imposes immediate sanction and
discharge on employees who fail to take oath to be a facially unconstitutional restrain of freedom of legal
aliens to obtain public employment); Fernandez v. Georgia, 716 F. Supp 1475 (1989) (holding that George
statute restricting opportunity to become state trooper to native-born U.S. citizens to violate the rights of
equal protection of foreign born naturalized applicants).
86
Teitscheid v. Leopold 342 F. Supp. 299 (1971) (invaliding state law prohibiting employment of aliens on
both 14th amendment and supremacy clause grounds, holding that such law served no compelling state

15

ground on the issue were Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission87 and Graham v.
Richardson.88 In Takahashi the Court struck down a statute that denied fishing licenses to
non-citizens, holding that lawful admittance into the country entitled aliens to equal
protection under state laws.89 In Graham the Court deemed classifications based on
alienage to be subject to strict judicial scrutiny because non-citizens constituted a discrete
and insular minority.90
Nonetheless, not all state regulation of non-citizen employment has been
restricted. The Court viewed restrictions on certain jobs as acceptable because those jobs
served a primarily political function, and subjected such restriction to a much more
deferential rational level of review.91 Jobs such as probation officers,92 school teachers,93
and state troopers94 can thus be restricted to citizens only, although, for no clear reason,
jobs such as lawyers95 cannot. Furthermore, and perhaps far more importantly, the Court
proved to be far more sympathetic to state regulation of alienage and immigration law
where it viewed implicit Congressional acquiescence as a possible justification.

interest and denial of work clearly created burden on aliens that Congress did not anticipate, impinging on
federal immigration process.
87
334 U.S. 410 (1948).
88
403 U.S. 365 (1971).
89
Takahashi, at 419-420.
90
Graham, at 371-72 (citing United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-153 n.4 (1938)).
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As such in De Canas v. Bica,96 the Supreme Court upheld California statute
penalizing employees for hiring illegal immigrants, reasoning that not all state laws
affecting non-citizens constitute attempts to regulate immigration. The court established a
three prong test to determine the constitutionality of state legislation: (1) state law may
not regulate immigration; (2) even if the statute did not regulate immigration it may still
be overturned if Congress explicitly stated its intent to occupy the field in such a way that
“complete[ly] oust[ed]”97 state power, and (3) the state law cannot serve as an “obstacle”
to the federal immigration policies.98
Section E: Structural bias as a possible explanation for differences in judicial
treatment of Congressional delegation in intra-federal and federal-to-state contexts.
The remarkably deferential treatment afforded to federal restrictions on
employment of non-citizens points to a very definite structural bias in the courts’ thinking
when compared to the high scrutiny similar restrictions receive in the state context. This
bias consists of an underlying presumption that while plenary immigration power
imposes few limits on federal authority to discriminate, the question of whether such
power could be delegated to the states, not to mention be exercised in absence of
Congressional declaration, is far from settled.99
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The source of structural bias affecting the analysis of the constitutionality of state
alienage classifications begins with the two decisions the Supreme Court reached in
Graham v. Richardson100 and Mathews v. Diaz.101 In Graham the Court held that a state
classification based on alienage is subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause,102 while in Mathews the Court found that the same classification if done by
federal government is subject only to rational basis of review.103 The doctrinal confusion
that ensued following these two decisions concerned the level of review the courts should
apply in situations where the states are carrying out an explicit Congressional policy. If
the resulting classifications are seen as incidents of federal policy, seemingly the
deferential rational basis of review in Mathews should apply. But what about the Graham
dicta which evidences the Court’s constitutional concern that the uniformity requirements
in the Naturalization Clause prohibit the federal government from authorizing the states
to adopt divergent policies affecting aliens?104
Recently two courts have reached cardinally different results on this very issue,
with the New Your Court of Appeals deciding in Aliessa v. Novello105 that Congress may
not delegate its plenary immigration power to the states thus leaving state’s classification
of aliens subject to strict scrutiny under Graham,106 whereas in Soskin v. Reinertson, the
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Tenth Circuit explicitly rejected Aliessa, in upholding a Colorado statute’s alienage
classifications, finding the appropriate standard of scrutiny to be rational basis in
Mathews.107
In Aliessa the state of New York administered a state-funded supplemental
Medicaid program that provided benefits to individuals whose incomes did not qualify
for Federal Medicaid but fell below the statutorily defined “standard of need.”108
Following the passage of PRWORA,109 the state eliminated this supplemental coverage
for qualified aliens under the five-year bar who had arrived after PRWORA’s enactment,
thus making alien eligibility the same as in federal Medicaid program.110 New York State
Court of Appeals, responding to the equal protection challenge by Aliessa plaintiffs, held
the state statute unconstitutional,111 explicitly relying on Graham’s dicta referencing
“explicit constitutional requirement of uniformity.”112 The Court reasoned that allowing
New York to determine for itself the extent to which it can discriminate against aliens
would be a direct contravention of the uniformity requirement of Naturalization clause, as
it would potentially create wide variation among the states regarding alien’s eligibility to
welfare.113 Since Congress was not allowed to delegate plenary power in such a way as
to violate the Naturalization clause, the state’s alienage classification was without
Congressional authorization and thus warranted strict scrutiny under Graham.114
In Soskin the state of Colorado had decided to continue to provide federal
Medicaid coverage to qualified aliens even though § 1612 of PRWORA authorized the
107
108
109
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state to deny such coverage.115 However in 2003, due to large deficits, the state
legislature reversed it decision, limiting its coverage to what PRWORA required.116
Responding to the plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Challenge, the Court stated that Congress
was empowered to pursue national policy stated in PRWORA, and that the state’s refusal
to provide optional benefits was in line with Congressional concern (and not just state
concern) that “individual aliens not burden the public benefit system.”117 The court
directly rejected Aliessa non-uniformity analysis, stating that uniformity concerns were
misplaced because both the states were not given unlimited discretion,118 and that
reliance on Naturalization clause as a source of Congressional authority was erroneous
because Naturalization clause was not the only source of immigration power, and that
distribution of welfare benefits bore no direct relationship to the naturalization process.119
It is evident that the outcome of these two cases is the direct consequence of the
structural bias running through the courts decisions, namely the assumption that the
nature of intra-federal delegation of plenary power is somehow fundamentally different
from federal-to-state delegation. While the results the courts had reached in Aliessa and
Soskin were cardinally different, both courts showed the same bias - viewing the nature
and the extent of Congressional delegation of plenary power to state entities as
fundamentally different from intra-federal delegation. In the reminder of this paper I
reject this structural bias, arguing that nothing in either history or sources of plenary
power precludes Congressional delegation to both federal agencies and state governments
on an equal footing as long as the extent of that delegation is made explicit.
115
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Part II: Explicit Delegation and the Need for the Rule of Uniformity
Section A: The case for explicit delegation and the search for doctrinal
consistency.
The present state of non-delegation doctrine in immigration and alienage law
leaves much to be desired. Perhaps one of the most acute problems with the current state
of affairs is the crisis of legitimacy that arises from the combination of broad
Congressional delegation to federal agencies and the plenary power Congress wields on
this issue. The consequence is that, given judicial unwillingness to enforce nondelegation, Congress is basically siphoning its legislative power to other branches in the
context where its power is at its peak, and virtually unchecked by judicial review.120
Imagine if Congress decided to delegate its power to declare war to an individual state, or
to one particular member of the executive branch!
The problem is symptomatic of the current state of non-delegation doctrine as a
whole. The disconnect between the principle of non-delegation from which the doctrine
derives its name, and the practical reality of having essentially two parallel legislative
systems – one Congressional and one administrative, creates a serious crisis of legitimacy
within the Federal government. If non-delegation doctrine truly mandates that Congress
cannot siphon off its legislative power to other branches then all three branches of
governments are involved in a massive constitutional violation of immense proportions.
The entire administrative state is basically a constitutional abomination, where Congress
is abdicating its constitutional duty to legislate, administrative agencies are exercising
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authority they don’t have, and the judiciary is letting them to get away with it. The crisis
of legitimacy is heightened in the immigration context, given the stakes and magnitude of
the power involved, where the tension between the need for delegation and the
importance of controlling the scope of this delegation is particularly acute.
Of course it would be madness to deny the practical need for the administrative
state, especially in the context of immigration and alienage law. Massive administrative
bureaucracy is essential to handle the inflow of immigrants, their registration,
naturalizations and processing of their applications.121 We need administrative agencies
to process visas abroad, decide who comes and goes of the country, and have access to
intelligence to weed out potential security threats. Furthermore, we need agencies that
can act quickly on potential security threats arising in immigration context – a function
for which a bi-cameral processes of legislation is ill-suited.
The tension between the need for delegation and the importance of controlling its
scope is equally high in the context of delegation of the federal alienage power to the
states. The federal government often needs state assistance and expertise in distribution
of social services and welfare benefits to immigrants. If we enforce the non-delegation of
immigration power too rigidly, the states would not be able to implement their own
programs in helping immigrants in ways that go beyond the “floor” of federal assistance,
thus dramatically affecting thousands if not hundreds of thousands of immigrants
depending on such benefits.
A new approach is needed to reconcile the doctrinal underpinnings of nondelegation doctrine in immigration and the practical realities of non-enforcement of this
121

For example, Homeland Security processed over 13 million US citizens and 21 million aliens in the
month of September 2004 alone. Fiscal Year End Statistical Reports, at
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doctrine. This doctrine should be able to address the concerns that critics have with the
current doctrine,122 and yet retain sufficient flexibility for the administrative state to
function. As such the doctrine will first preserve the functionality of the administrative
state, acknowledging the value of expertise and deliberation inherent in agency decisions,
and the reality of the need for agency delegation given the sheer scale and volume of
necessary regulation. Second, it will ensure greater Congressional accountability by
requiring that delegation be explicit, and forcing Congress to specify the exact
dimensions of its delegation authority.
I draw on the principles articulated by Professor Thomas W. Merrill (who calls it
exclusive delegation) in his article proposing the creation of a new delegation doctrine123
to argue that establishment of a new explicit delegation doctrine in the context of
immigration and alienage law may be able to solve some of the structural problems and
biases I outlined earlier. Explicit delegation doctrine consists of two principles: antiinherency and transferability. Anti-inherency simply means that judicial and executive
officials will have no inherent authority to act with the force of law, unless they can trace
such authority to some provision of enacted law. Transferability means that Congress has
power to vest executive and judicial officers with authority to promulgate legislative
regulations functionally identical to the statutes. Adoption of these two principles would
ensure that Congressional delegation is explicit in its form, clearly articulating the scope
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of the power being delegated (transferability), and the authority to which this power is
being delegated to (anti-inherency).
Section B: Benefits of explicit delegation
I believe that the principle benefit of the explicit delegation doctrine is that it
provides a coherent theoretical foundation for a practice in which Congress, the judiciary
and the executive branch are already involved. The cardinal difference lies not in the
scope of powers Congress can delegate but in the way Congress describes those powers.
In this context explicit delegation may placate critics of weak non-delegation doctrine
who see it as a loophole for Congress to abdicate its constitutional and democratic
responsibility for making policy choices. Indeed, explicit delegation’s first principle of
anti-inherency makes it harder for Congress to disclaim responsibility, since for Congress
to vest federal agency or a state with the power they need, Congress must explicitly
delegate the authority to act legislatively and precisely delineate the scope of authority to
be exercised. As such, monitoring and control of Congressional delegation would be
more clearly on display, and thus would make it more accountable for policy choices that
it makes.
Explicit delegation may also better promote the role of checks and balances in the
federal government, as well as in the larger context of federalism.124 Critics of current
non-delegation doctrine assert that one of its weaknesses is that it encourages Congress to
give away too much power to the executive – creating a dangerous strain on the system of
checks and balances.125 Explicit delegation doctrine’s principles of anti-inherency and
transferability, however, help to ensure that such siphoning of democracy does not
124
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happen, forcing delegation to be couched in terms that are both specific and definite.
Given the institutional reluctance of any branch of government to give away too much of
its power in favor of another branch and the fact that Congress cannot delegate power to
itself in avoidance of bicameralism and presentment126 – Congress will have an inherent
incentive to carefully regulate how much power it delegates to other branches and states,
as well as a powerful defense against any unauthorized grab of power (anti-inherency
principle). Finally, explicit delegation, by the virtue of transferability principle, allows
the same degree of flexibility and efficiency as weak non-delegation. It preserves the
administrative state and federal-to-state delegation, only asking for a specific grant of
authority in return.
Section C: Explicit delegation and constitutional sources of its two guiding
principles: transferability and anti-inherency
In his article Professor Merrill establishes two guiding principles framing the new
doctrine: anti-inherency and transferability. The anti-inherency principle states that
judicial and executive officials have no inherent authority to act with the force of law and
must always trace such authority to some provision of enacted law.127 Support for antiinherency principle in the Constitution can be traced all the way back to the Youngstown
decision,128 where Justice Jackson in his famous concurrence established the tripartite
analysis of executive power.129 There Justice Jackson stated that Presidential and thus the
executive power is at its peak where President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, and his power is at its lowest ebb where President takes
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measures incompatible with the express or implied will of Congress.130 The twilight zone
of presidential authority, according to Jackson, lay in the middle where Congress has not
spoken and the president could only rely on his own independent powers (whatever they
may be).131
In immigration context, given the plenary power of Congress in immigration and
alienage matters, the independent authority of the executive branch seems somewhat
diminished outside explicit Congressional authorization, considerably shrinking the
“twilight zone”. Possible exceptions may include incidents where President’s control
over immigration is moored less in Congressional authorization and more in independent
sources of authority stemming from the emergency powers of the president.132
The transferability principle states that Congress has the power to vest executive
and judicial officers with authority to promulgate legislative regulation functionally
identical to the statutes.133 The concept of transferability is nothing new and hasn’t been
in doubt, at least when it comes to questions of intra-federal delegation. As such, in
United States v. Gramaud134 Congress authorized an agency to promulgate rules that
were enforced by criminal sanctions. In Mistretta v. United States,135 the court said as
much explicitly – “rulemaking power originates in the Legislative Branch and becomes
an executive function only when delegated by the Legislative Branch and becomes an
executive function only when delegated by the Legislature to the Executive Branch.”136
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In terms of delegation of immigration power from Congress to the states, the issue
is more complicated. At least one state supreme court

137

and some critics138 charge that

Congress may not delegate immigration power to the states since that would violate the
uniformity requirement of Naturalization Clause139 of the Constitution.140 More
specifically, they allege that the whole concept of plenary power is predicated on the
notion of uniformity that framers sought to grant to Congress as a way to prevent each
state from adopting its own rules of immigration.141 The problem with this criticism
however is that it suffers from a fallacy of overgeneralization. While the reasoning is
sound when it is applied to the immigration law that deals with the actual processes of
naturalization given that the Naturalization Clause,142 when read in conjunction with
Necessary and Proper Clause,143 allows Congress to make rules relating to the procedural
and substantive process of naturalization itself.144 However, the scope of the
Naturalization Clause with its attendant uniformity requirement must be read narrowly;
leaving questions of treatment of aliens in alienage law contexts such as access to public
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services, jobs and other benefits outside the scope of the clause and thus subject to
delegation unconstrained by the uniformity requirement.145
There are two additional reasons why the scope Naturalization Clause should be
read narrowly. First, historically the purpose of the Naturalization Clause was to curb
potentially dangerous consequences of having states with divergent naturalization rules in
light of the Comity Clause in the Articles of Confederation (similar to privileges and
immunities clause)146. Prior to the adoption of the Naturalization Clause, an alien could
forum shop from one state to another until he (and in those times it was invariably he) got
the favorable determination, which was then binding on every other state.147 Second, the
uniformity requirement does not explain the judicial tolerance for divergent state policies
toward undocumented aliens. For example in De Canas v. Bica148, the court has upheld a
California law criminalizing the employment of illegal aliens. Other sources of
immigration power are also unconvincing –nothing in foreign affairs power, foreign
commerce clause or inherent sovereignty power places a categorical ban on
Congressional power to authorize states to adopt alienage classifications. For example,
the argument that the Compact Clause149 creates a negative implication that devolution of
other foreign affairs powers to the state is not very convincing, since Constitution
explicitly prohibits states from engaging in other enumerated foreign affairs activities
such as entering into treaties and alliances and granting Letters of Marque and
145
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Reprisals.150 As such, if anything, the implication from such explicit bars would be that
foreign affairs powers that are not barred are in fact permitted.151
A useful analogy could be Congressional power to delegate control over Indian
affairs to individual states, pursuant to its plenary power. As in immigration, Indian law
is an area where government’s plenary power enables it to classify individuals in ways
that “might otherwise be constitutionally offensive.”152 In Yakima the court upheld the
statute authoring states to extend criminal and civil jurisdiction over tribal lands, holding
that Congress may chose to readjust allocation of jurisdiction between states and tribes.153
Professor Wishnie154 challenges this analogy, and argues that the difference in
immigration context is that immigration is an exclusive power that may not be delegated
in the same manner as a power over Indian affairs.155 This objection misses the point– the
exclusivity dimension of the non-delegation doctrine of immigration applies only to
naturalization requirements itself (consistent with the historical purpose of the uniformity
clause). However, when it comes to a broader spectrum of rights arising out of alien’s
classifications – access to jobs and welfare being the prime example, Congressional
power to delegate is not so limited.
Overall, I believe that explicit delegation doctrine and its twin principles of
transferability and anti-inherency is applicable in both intra-federal and federal-to-state
contexts. The bottom line is that, if these two principles are to be taken seriously,
Congressional delegation will have to be much more explicit in its form, clearly
150
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articulating the scope of the power being delegated (transferability), and the precise
authority to which this power is being delegated (anti-inherency).
Part III – judicial review under the new regime of explicit delegation
Section A: The role of judicial review in the context of delegation
Given the emphasis that explicit delegation doctrine places in ensuring
transparency and accountability of Congressional delegation in both intra-federal and
federal-to-state contexts, the role of the judicial review of agency or state action pursuant
to such delegation becomes critically important. I believe that in instances where
Congress adopts explicit delegation as a way to delegate its legislative power to either
administrative agency or a state, judicial review of agency’s or state’s regulation pursuant
to that delegation must follow a deferential standard first articulated in the famous
Chevron156 case. However, if Congress chooses to follow the current “intelligible
principle” standard when delegating its power in immigration or alienage law context,
courts should apply a more searching scrutiny, asking whether agency’s or state’s
decision is motivated by a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to that interest.157
Of course one must first examine the current state of judicial review to be able to
extrapolate the shape such review may take in the context of explicit delegation.
Section B: Judicial review in the current non-delegation regime.
The weakness of the current non-delegation doctrine led the Court to adopt rules
that would allow it to review and invalidate agency decisions that it viewed as stemming
156
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from too broad a reading of delegating statute in question. In other words, the courts
changed the focus of the non-delegation doctrine from reviewing the Congressional
delegation to reviewing agency’s interpretation of such delegation.158 Given the demise
of legislative veto in Chada159 judicial review effectively became the only check against
administrative agency’s action outside the bicameral process of legislation and
presentment.160 When reviewing interpretations that agencies make in the context of their
delegated power, the courts often follow a two step process: they first look at the canons
of judicial interpretation to avoid invalidation of Congressional delegation, and then
apply Chevron161 standard of review when examining the administrative action stemming
from such delegation.
When applying the canons of judicial interpretations, the courts use clearstatement rule and cannon of avoidance to ensure that whatever Congressional delegation
is passed, it is upheld. In Kent v. Dulles,162 the Court applied the canon of clear-statement
and refused to construe a broadly worded statute to permit the Secretary of State the right
to travel, although the statute authorized the secretary to issue passports according to the
rules set by the President, who, in turn, gave the Secretary discretion to deny passports
for any reason.163 The Secretary used that discretion to deny passports to members of
Communist party.164 The court construed the statute narrowly, citing Panama Refining165
as a precedent for “important constitutional questions” a broader reading would have
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entailed. The court held that in cases where individual liberties may be curtailed,
Congress needs to make a “clear statement” to that effect in the statute.166 Canon of
avoidance is another theory that allows the Court to avoid interpretations that are
constitutionally suspect on the legal fiction that Congress would not have intended such
interpretations.167
The Chevron review of agency actions stems from, perhaps, one of the most
significant cases of the 20th century Chevron, USA, Inc., Co. v. Natural Resource Defense
Council.168 The outcome of that case signaled a new regime for reviewing agency’s
interpretations of federal statutes. In Chevron the Court announced that it will defer to a
reasonable agency interpretation of ambiguous statutory terms, and devised a two-step
way for determining when this deference should be exercised.169 In the first step, the
court asks whether Congress has spoken to the precise issue or has left a gap for the
agency to fill.170 If Congress has in fact spoken clearly on the issue in question, then that
meaning is dispositive, regardless of what the agency has to say.171 If however, and most
often, the legislative provision is ambiguous, the second question of Chevron is whether
the agency’s interpretation is permissible or reasonable.172
Although deferential in principle, Chevron has been often circumvented by judges
both on the left and right who disagreed with the agency interpretation. As such, Justice
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Stevens in I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonesca,173 rejected INS’s statutory interpretation of the
words “well-founded fear of prosecution” as flatly wrong.”174 When interpreting the
statute INS attributed the same meaning to the phrase as the mandatory-asylum provision
of the statute, which prohibited deportation of any alien who showed a “clear probability
of persecution.”175 Although Justice Stevens acknowledged that there was some
ambiguity in the statute, he nonetheless felt that text and legislative history made it clear
what the “right” meaning of the term was.176 Justice Scalia had likewise refused to defer
to agency interpretation of a seemingly ambiguous statute in Maislin Indus. v. Primary177
Steel, where he refused to show deference to the Interstate Commerce Commission’s take
on the word reasonable as used in Interstate Commerce Act.178
Overall, the judicial review regime currently in place effectively transfers the
authority over the final say regarding the specifics of delegation from Congress to the
Courts. Faced with exceedingly vague Congressional declarations, agencies are often at
the mercy of the ideological winds of the federal courts who end up to be the final
arbiter’s of what the Congress “meant to say” when in reality Congress said precisely
nothing.
Section C: Judicial review in the context of explicit delegation
In the context of explicit delegation in immigration and alienage law, the courts
should apply Chevron deference much in the same manner it has been applied before.
The difference lies not in the new standard but in the increased guidance that
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Congressional delegation would contain. Such guidance would make the firs step of
Chevron applicable in more cases, and where it would not be – it would make the
interpretation of what Congress considered reasonable that much clearer. The courts
would then have a much easier time reviewing the agency’s decision based on what
Congress actually meant to say, instead of substituting their own versions of what
Congress intended in its vague proclamations over the similar guesses of the agencies.
The real difference will come when agency decisions stem from Congressional
declaration that does not follow the explicit delegation doctrine, but instead relies on the
vague pronouncements of the old non-delegation principles. In this latter case, the courts
should review the agency’s decisions dealing with immigration and alienage law
applying the strict scrutiny standard, first articulated in this context in Graham179 to
police against Congress trying to siphon its plenary immigration power in a
constitutionally prohibited manner.
Crucially, this two-tiered system of judicial review should apply with equal force
to Congressional delegation of immigration power to agencies and the states. As was
previously argued, nothing in either naturalization clause, history or original intent of the
framers precludes Congress from delegating its plenary power to either states or federal
agencies on the equal basis.180 The current regime of judicial review of Congressional
delegation to the states remains confused and mangled at best – the decisions in Aliessa181
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and Soskin182 provide apt demonstration. It would therefore follow that the courts should
apply the same standards of review of delegation in both contexts, removing the need for
doctrinal confusion that began with the Graham/Mathews decisions and continues to this
day in Aliessa and Soskin.
Conclusion
We are a nation of immigrants. This phrase has been repeated so often that it has
become a cliché, yet it is almost universally accepted as true.183 Another phrase that often
accompanies the first one is that we are all Americans. An outsider is likely to conclude
after hearing these two phrases together that we are a nation of immigrants who are all
Americans. Ironically, this would be wrong. Instead, the idea of who belongs and who
doesn’t is defined by a vague, shifting and uncertain patchwork of laws, customs, history
and assumptions that Americans, their government and immigrants make about what it
takes to be an American.
This ambivalence about national identity coupled with the tremendous power that
Congress wields on issues pertaining to immigration and alienage law makes the need for
transparency pertaining to how and to whom Congress delegates its power particularly
acute. Indeed, legislative transparency is the only way to ensure that Congress remains
accountable for the legislative choices that it makes on these difficult issues. The current
state of Congressional delegation in the context of immigration and alienage law is too
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vague and inconsistent to meet the standard of democratic accountability that is required
given the plenary power of Congress over the matter.
This article sought to present an alternative way to frame Congressional
delegation of plenary power - a way in which Congress can delegate its power in both
intra-federal and federal-to-state contexts, as long as such delegation remains explicit. I
called this view explicit delegation. I believe explicit delegation is a better way to achieve
legislative transparency, which is a necessary check on plenary power of Congress over
the matter.
The first part of my proposal deals with the way Congress delegates power. In this
context I argue that explicit delegation, with its principles of anti-inherency and
transferability, while functionally preserving the current administrative state, would
provide a coherent doctrinal backdrop for the Congress to justify its delegation practices.
The second part of my proposal suggested that adopting explicit delegation as a principle
vehicle for delegating power would allow Congress to delegate its plenary power on an
equal basis to federal agencies and individual state governments.
Finally, the third part of my proposal outlined the level of judicial review the
courts should exercise when reviewing agency’s or state’s decisions pursuant to
Congressional delegation of power in matter of immigration and alienage law. As such, I
suggest that where Congress adopts explicit delegation as means of transferring its power
to either a state or a federal agencies, the courts should adopt deferential standard of
review first articulated in the famous Chevron case, where reviewing the interpretation
the state or the agency make of the authorizing statute. On the other hand, where
Congressional delegation falls short of this standard, the courts should exercise the strict
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scrutiny of the kind articulated in Graham when assessing the state’s or agency’s
interpretation of the statute in question.
I believe that adoption of explicit delegation as a principle lens through which
courts view Congressional delegation of its legislative authority in the context of
immigration and alienage law will placate numerous critics of the current non-delegation
doctrine, preserve the functionality and flexibility of the current administrative state, and
allow the states the flexibility they need to deal with immigration and alienage law issues
particular to their unique environments. Most importantly, I believe Congressional
delegation that is clear about the extent and the source of the authority it delegates will
make American democracy stronger by conferring a great degree of legitimacy to the
agencies’ and states’ actions resulting from such delegation.
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